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Abstract: Over the last two decades Kazakhstan has implemented foreign policies
aimed at improving relations with many new geopolitical actors, as well as longstanding
common partners such as Russia, on which it was formerly heavily dependent. By util-
ising its huge hydrocarbon production potential, Kazakhstan has managed to surpass
all other Central Asian states in political and economic importance. Kazakhstan has
now turned its eyes to China, seeing it as an important and powerful partner in the
economic, political and security spheres. This article deals with fundamental issues in
Kazakhstan’s relations with China.
Kazakhstan has become an important player in Central Asia’s regional relations inrecent years. International observers have underscored the many positive changes
made by the country. Kazakhstan has achieved higher levels of real economic and
social development than other regional states. In macroeconomic terms, Kazakhstan
has the largest economy in Central Asia and has recorded impressive growth levels
since it gained independence in 1991. It quickly recovered from the depths of the
2008/2009 world economic crisis.1 Kazakhstan’s success is worth underscoring, as
it is the only Central Asian country that appears in the list of countries with a high
level of human development.2
However, it seems that a well-coordinated effort is being made by Astana and
European Union members to overestimate the country’s achievements, while con-
scientiously ignoring its problems.3 Western pundits also sometimes seem unwilling
to criticise the ‘Kazakhstani path’4 of development, although the country still has
serious infrastructure problems,5 an authoritarian political system and an insufficient
diverse economic base.6 It should be apparent to all stakeholders that, regardless of
how impressive Kazakhstan’s economic performance might appear at first glance,
there is room for further improvement. The country is still largely dependent on its
neighbours in various economic sectors and is continuously seeking opportunities to
sustain its growth through regional and global economic cooperation. In that sense,
China–Kazakhstan relations are especially important, not only in terms of overall
trade turnover between the two countries, but because of the sustainability of both
the ‘Kazakhstani path’ and Central Asia’s stability.
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Strategic Analysis 41
Kazakhstan–China relations
Political relations between Kazakhstan and China have been cordial since 1991, the
year Kazakhstan achieved independence. Old disputes over their common border have
been settled and closer political contacts established. Chinese and Kazakhstani offi-
cials often meet to discuss bilateral issues and, according to Astana, ‘ . . . developing
and maintaining good neighborly relations with China is a top priority’.7 Both coun-
tries are members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and other regional
and sub-regional groupings committed to promoting political cooperation, economic
development and security. This strong reciprocal support is deemed essential to achieve
some of their most important mutual foreign policy goals. For instance, Kazakhstan
supports Beijing’s ‘One China’ policy, thus supporting Beijing’s official position on
Taiwan and Tibet,8 while China backs Kazakhstan’s almost two-decade-long bid to
become a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO).9
Equally positive are their bilateral economic relations, which have been intensify-
ing for many years. China’s willingness and ability to invest in Kazakhstan has been
the main factor driving continual improvement in their trade relations.10 Impressive
figures support these economic relations. In early 2011, for example, Beijing made a
loan worth $1.7 billion to the Kazakhstani National Welfare Fund (Samruk-Kazyna)
and another worth $5 billion to the Kazakhstani petrochemical industry, in addition to
pledging to buy Kazakhstani uranium for an estimated $8 billion.11
Astana welcomes this uptick in the Chinese influence, as it contributes to diversi-
fying the country’s economy. Mutual trade relations were for many years concentrated
in gas and oil exports from Kazakhstan to China. However, they have now entered into
a process of diversification, and positive outcomes are expected from further economic
integration between the two countries, especially in the border regions.12
Improved bilateral relations underscore these beneficial developments and might in
the midterm help Kazakhstan consolidate its achievements. Since 2011 Kazakhstani
and Chinese state officials have come together several times to discuss economic,
political, cultural and security issues. In June 2011, Chinese President Hu Jintao
and Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev discussed the specifics of their
security partnership, signed in 2005, and affixed their signatures on a document on
‘Development of an All-Round Strategic Partnership’, which stipulates a commit-
ment to enhance bilateral trade and increase the frequency of meetings between top
officials.13 Since the beginning of the 2000s Kazakhstan–China relations have been put
on a strong footing. Nazarbayev and Hu Jintao, when they meet, leave the impression of
sharing a deep understanding. Kazakhstan’s presidency of the SCO in the second half
of 2011 provided many opportunities for the two heads of state to discuss face-to-face
various aspects of bilateral cooperation. Chinese officials have repeatedly expressed
satisfaction with the evolution of bilateral trade relations in recent times and strongly
supported the opening of the Khorgos International Centre of Boundary Cooperation,
a transnational free trade centre on the border of Kazakhstan and China, spanning
a 3.36 million m2 area of Chinese territory and 1.6 million m2 area of Kazakhstani
land.14
Kazakhstani and Chinese officials have ample reason to be content with the trade
volumes between the two countries. In 2011, the bilateral trade volume amounted to
$20 billion, up from a disappointing $8.3 billion in 2006. This is a significantly larger
volume than the trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Russia, two countries that
are trying to boost their trade through a customs union.15 Initially, Astana and Beijing
set the goal of reaching a trade volume of $15 billion by 2015. Fortunately, the value
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42 Richard Rousseau
of bilateral trade is already, in the first quarter of 2012, $5 billion above the planned
level.16 In addition to trade, Kazakhstan’s friendship is also essential for China since
it is a major transit country. For instance, the improvement of the railway connec-
tion between north-west China and south-east Kazakhstan and onward into Russia and
Western Europe was at the top of the agenda in their bilateral discussion.
These developments indicate that Kazakhstan is an increasingly important player in
China’s strategy in the Central Asia region, while Russia’s influence in that region is
steadily declining in relative terms. China, Turkey and, to a much lesser extent, Iran
are making rapid gains at the expense of Russia. This trend is evidenced both by
data, as noted above, and by changes observable in both domestic markets and tra-
ditional bazaars across the region. The increasing Chinese presence is even changing
the lifestyles of ordinary people. The flood of cheap and affordable Chinese goods has
allowed Central Asians, even in the smallest and most remote villages, to buy products
that they previously had never dreamed of seeing. In all probability, Russia will become
progressively less able to hinder China’s penetration into the region. Commercially,
the future does not look enviable for Moscow as by 2015 the bilateral trade between
China and Kazakhstan is expected to reach $40 billion,17 an increase that will further
strengthen China’s foothold in Central Asia.
Much to Moscow’s dismay, improvements in Kazakhstani–Chinese economic rela-
tions are expected to increase even further in the years to come. At the end of
September 2011, Chinese and Kazakhstani business people met to discuss invest-
ment projects between the two countries. The chairman of the Standing Committee
of China’s National People’s Congress, Wu Bangguo, who attended the meeting,
focused the talks on future cooperation possibilities in energy, mineral extraction, met-
allurgy, road and railway construction, telecommunications and agriculture. He also
drew attention to the need to improve cooperation between Kazakhstani and Chinese
firms and augment the volume of investments.18 Perhaps more importantly, Bangguo
insisted that there are many opportunities for cooperation in manufacturing and service
sectors.
Since independence, Kazakhstan’s president has been adamant about the necessity
to diversify the Kazakhstani economy away from energy production and export, as this
makes the country too dependent on fluctuating oil and gas prices. A rapidly developing
partner like China would certainly help President Nazarbayev achieve this objective.
However, one can only be doubtful whether Chinese investments and cooperation will
actually bring about economic diversification in Kazakhstan. The Kazakhstani elite,
on which this process of diversification depends heavily, may not actually have a
strong enough interest in altering the present economic structure. Kazakhstan’s his-
torical experience has demonstrated that poorly diversified economies, which rely
heavily on natural resources for generating revenues, are the best models political and
economic elites can use to indulge in kleptocracy.19 It remains to be seen whether
the Kazakhstan–China economic partnership will serve the interests of ordinary
Kazakhstanis or merely the members of the president’s circle.
Energy cooperation
Energy development and export largely dominates Kazakhstani–Chinese relations.
Beijing considers Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, a crucial
element in its energy equation and has geared its policy in such a way as to secure
as many resources as possible from this region.20 Central Asia can play a major role
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Strategic Analysis 43
in helping Beijing diversify its energy suppliers. It can also reduce, by the same token,
China’s reliance on Middle East oil exporters, who exported to China more than two
million barrels/day in 2010.21 Beijing keeps a close eye on the current political events
in the Middle East, and the instability that comes with them. Chinese policy planners
develop alternative policies which could be implemented in the event that the United
States decides to close, or at least filter, the Strait of Malacca, through which oil car-
goes from the Middle East must pass.22 Under these circumstances, China’s oil and
gas imports from Central Asia will probably continue over the next few years—even
potentially for decades—prompting the expansion of the energy sectors of the Central
Asian hydrocarbon-rich states. Furthermore, Chinese imports of Central Asian oil and
gas will divert a massive amount of revenue from China to Central Asia, in addition
to providing a powerful alternative buyer to Russia.23 This will in turn give Central
Asian governments more political leeway in their international relations. Kazakhstan
seems quite conscious of this situation, and is accordingly currying favour with China,
knowing the many benefits it could potentially reap.
The spectacular economic growth in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the
last 20 years has generated intensive use of primary energy resources. Since the first
half of the 1990s, China has not been able to meet all its energy needs from its own
production and has thus become a net importer of oil and gas. The country became a
net importer of natural gas in 2008 as the gap between supply and demand approached
five billion cubic metres. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, and to a lesser
extent Uzbekistan, have abundant reserves of oil and are export-oriented economies.
Therefore, the Chinese authorities have progressively made energy a priority issue on
their Central Asian agenda. This development has important implications and can be
analysed from various angles. Firstly, China’s own perspective on its present boom and
how Beijing’s involvement in the Central Asian republics’ development is perceived
need to be taken into consideration. Secondly, the growing role of Central Asian energy
issues in China’s policy has important geopolitical implications, specifically on the
relations between Moscow and Beijing. Energy is one of the strategic issues where
the interests of Beijing and Moscow are clearly divergent and it has the potential to
complicate the cooperative atmosphere the two powers have enjoyed in recent years.
Moreover, it is necessary to contextualise the Caspian Basin’s place within the overall
energy strategy of the PRC.
Kazakhstan has become one of China’s main energy suppliers. In 2011, 11 million
tons of oil flowed to China through the Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline, which runs from
Kazakhstan’s Caspian shore to Xinjiang in China.24 During a September 2011 visit to
Central Asia, Chinese officials expressed their desire to expand energy trade with oil-
rich Kazakhstan.25 The latter’s oil exports are set to swell over the next few years.
Astana is expecting a 50 per cent increase by 2020,26 and China will receive the lion’s
share of this, as its domestic demand is increasing dramatically. Kazakhstan plans to
export 22 million tons/year of oil to China by 2020, up from 12.1 million tons in
2011.27 To achieve this, it is currently boosting the export capacity of the Kazakhstan–
China pipeline and constructing a parallel gas pipeline scheduled for completion by
2014.28 This additional pipeline will also enable Kazakhstan to transport gas extracted
in the western part of the country, where most of the deposits are located, to the more
industrialised southern regions, reducing by the same token their reliance on Uzbek
gas imports.29
As in other areas, the purchase of oil deposits and the signing of long-term energy
supply contracts are the main instruments used by China to influence the energy sector
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44 Richard Rousseau
of Central Asian states. In 1997, after three years of negotiations, the China National
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) began operating in Kazakhstan. Other major Chinese
firms soon followed. In addition, Beijing and Astana signed in that year an agreement
to construct a pipeline of almost 4,800 km connecting the Caspian Sea and the Xinjiang
region in north-west China.
The construction of the Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline was divided into three
sections. The first section, linking Atyrau (north Caspian) with Aktobe region oil
fields (western Kazakhstan) was completed in March 2003. This section also car-
ries oil to the west, towards the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) pipeline, which
connects the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan with the Russian port of Novorossiysk
on the Black Sea, through Atyrau. The second 1,000-km section was built between
September 2004 and December 2005 and links Atasu in central Kazakhstan to the
border town of Alashankou in China’s Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region. Like all
other milestones in China’s Central Asian energy development, the opening of this
section of nearly 1,000 miles generated much debate and some stridency. However, the
Atasu–Alashankou section, the most important of the Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline,
is able to deliver only 10 million tons of crude oil a year to China, a modest
amount considering China’s oil needs. The third and final section, which connects
Kenkiyak with Kumpol, was as per an agreement between Kazakhstan and China
on 18 August 2007 and completed on 11 July 2009. This pipeline makes it pos-
sible to pump oil directly from the northern Caspian to the Dushanzi refinery in
Xinjiang.
To feed the pipeline, China has acquired, through various companies, exploitation
rights to various oil fields in Kazakhstan. In the process Chinese companies have had
to cope with both the suspicion their presence arouses and the relative delay in getting
anything done, thus harming their position in the coveted Kazakh Caspian offshore
fields. The exception is the Darkhan deposit, which they exploit under an agreement
signed in October 2008. However, making a virtue of necessity and following a consis-
tent business strategy, China has invested in oil fields located in the Aktobe region and
in other more isolated sites along the route of the Sino-Kazakh oil pipeline (Buzachi
North, Karazhanbas and Kumkol in the Kyzyl-Orda region).30 These, along with the
aforementioned Atasu connection to the pipeline going to Russia, make the Sino-
Kazakh oil pipeline an alternative route for exporting Russian oil from western Siberia
to China. As a result, Beijing has virtually assured sources of supply for a pipeline
which currently has a maximum annual capacity of 20 million tons of crude that could
be expanded to 30.
The most significant Chinese investments in the Kazakh hydrocarbon sector
have been the $4.2 takeover of PetroKazakhstan, a Canadian-based company, by the
Chinese oil company CNPC in August 2005 and the purchase for US$1.91 billion
of the Kazakhstan oil assets of Canada’s Nations Energy Company Ltd by the China
International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) in December 2006. Through
these two acquisitions Beijing acquired an important position in the Kazakh oil market
and although the figures available vary substantially and are difficult to compute, it is
estimated that in 2006 China was responsible for about 25 per cent of all oil extraction
in Kazakhstan.31
This increase in China’s presence in the Kazakh oil sector generated an animated
public debate led by those who see in Beijing’s policy a growing threat to Kazakhstan’s
economic sovereignty and autonomous development prospects. While some local ana-
lysts are known to dissent from the majority view and point out, for example, that
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Strategic Analysis 45
contracts signed with Chinese companies are more beneficial to Kazakhstan than those
signed with large Western companies, the controversy over the Chinese acquisitions
has more particularly culminated in the Majlis, the parliament of Kazakhstan, which
approved in September 2007 the introduction of a series of amendments to the law ‘on
subsurface and the use of the subsurface’ dated 27 January 1996. The law expanded
Astana’s ability to revise or annul contracts concerning the exploitation of subsurface
resources and posing a threat to ‘national economic security interests’.32 As a response
to the $1.9 billion sale of the Karazhanbas oil field by Canada-based Nations Energy to
CITIC, the Kazakh government passed a law preventing foreign investors from selling
stakes in Kazakhstan’s assets to third parties. Also, the 2005 sale of PetroKazakhstan
Inc. to CNPC illustrated the need for the new law giving Kazakhstan the first right
of refusal to buy assets in any proposed transfer of oil assets between foreign com-
panies. Also, KasMunaiGas became a stakeholder in PetroKazakhstan in 2005, and
following the passage of this amendment, KasMunaiGas executed an agreement with
CITIC to purchase 50 per cent of Karazhanbas. It is interesting to note that the
above PetroKazakhstan purchase created a similar reaction in Russia, especially among
companies active in Kazakhstan, which share these misgivings about the progressive
Chinese encroachment.
The purchase of the Canadian firm by CNPC led to the Russian company Lukoil,
which owns 25 per cent of the rights to the North Kumkol deposit, to go to both
the Court of International Arbitration in Stockholm and the Kazakh courts to claim
a preferential right to acquire the deposit. Through this action, Lukoil, which won
the lawsuit, secured the rights to the entire reservoir. Lukoil is officially a private oil
company but its actions, as is well known in the energy industry, are often in line
with the wishes of the Kremlin. Therefore, some authors believe that this action shows
that ‘Russia is unwilling to allow China to have direct access to Central Asian energy
resources’.33
Within the SCO, which is paying increasing attention to energy issues, the
approaches of Kazakhstan and Russia coincide. Despite the fear of potential dom-
inance, Kazakhstan estimates that China’s presence in its oil sector is of strategic
importance in the long term. The Kazakhstan–China oil pipeline has already reduced
Kazakhstan’s dependence on the old Soviet pipeline network through which the major-
ity of Kazakh oil exports still flow. The new pipeline allows direct access to the global
economy, with its ever expanding oil consumption. Moreover, the weight of Chinese
companies in the sector, though increasing, is still small in relative terms and barring
new purchases of large deposits, their share in total Kazakh production will decrease
significantly when the extraction of oil from the offshore Kashagan field, situated in
the northern part of the Caspian Sea, begins.34
While energy will undoubtedly remain the nucleus of China–Kazakhstan cooper-
ation, Chinese officials hope that in future this cooperation will not remain limited to
oil and gas; they believe that it should be extended to clean and renewable energy as
well.35 In that regard, Beijing has singled out nuclear energy as a potentially important
sector for bilateral cooperation. In 2011 Kazakhstan, which is well endowed with ura-
nium ore, began exporting the indispensable resource for producing nuclear energy to
China.36
These developments can only benefit Kazakhstan, as it requires new trading part-
ners if it is to become one of the top five oil producers in the world.37 President
Nazarbayev has also committed his country to diversifying the economy, which can
be achieved through major investment in the renewable energy sector.
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46 Richard Rousseau
Security cooperation
Security is a top priority in China’s Central Asian strategy. During his meeting with
Nazarbayev in summer 2011, President Jintao stressed the importance of security. He
particularly outlined what he considers the three main ‘evils’ in Central Asia: sepa-
ratism, extremism and terrorism.38 The list is not surprising, as it reflects Beijing’s
preoccupation with the destabilising activities in Xinjiang, a turbulent Chinese
autonomous region, which has experienced sporadic outbursts of social violence. The
Muslim and Turkic Uyghur, who constitute the majority of the population, claim that
their region is a victim of Chinese discrimination, colonialism and oppression.39 The
July 2011 explosion of violence cast a shadow of pessimism over long-lasting stability
in Xinjiang.40 Xinjiang is a strategic region for China, as all Central Asian oil and gas
pipelines linking the eastern part of China to Central Asia run across that territory. The
eruption of violence in this strategic territory could adversely impinge on Chinese oil
imports and put at risk Beijing’s energy security.
It is no wonder then that the Chinese leadership is manifestly fearful of instability
and religiously motivated terrorism, as evidenced by China’s vigorous pleas to enhance
the role of the SCO to ensure regional stability.41 In this respect, security is more
and more a determining factor in the relations between China and Kazakhstan, and in
the short term it will have an increasingly important part to play within the SCO.42
Some Kazakhstani observers, however, believe that Kazakhstan–China cooperation is
actually much more a showcase of Beijing’s diplomatic skills than a bona fide desire to
establish friendly relations, while respecting Kazakhstan’s sovereignty. They argue that
true cooperation within the SCO will be difficult to achieve because Russia is unlikely
to let the Central Asian states, with which it has strong and historical ties, drift away
towards China without resistance.43
For Beijing, the best way to promote security may actually be through deeper eco-
nomic cooperation with Astana. China’s policies towards the five republics of Central
Asia seek quite unequivocally to integrate Xinjiang’s economy with those of Central
Asian states.44 The Chinese often emphasise that the westernmost Chinese region
shares deep cultural roots with Kazakhstan and that a trade partnership can only
benefit the two, and the regions beyond. Bangguo, for instance, called the Khorgos
centre a powerful opportunity to improve trade between Kazakhstan and China’s
western regions and increase cooperation at the regional level.45 Beijing is currently
implementing an ambitious plan to improve economic conditions in Xinjiang, reduce
instances of social unrest and alleviate the frustration of the local Uyghur population.
Kazakhstan’s further economic integration into the Chinese north-west region has the
potential to strengthen security through economic prosperity for an unpredictable and
strategically pivotal region.
Risky diversification
A lack of diversification and a dependence on oil and gas exports are the two main
problems of the Kazakhstani economy. China’s investments in the secondary and ter-
tiary economic sectors may prove the correct means to overcome these obstacles and
gear the Kazakhstani economy towards the production of value-added manufactured
goods.
It could permit Kazakhstan to avoid what the economist Barry Eichengreen calls
the ‘middle-income trap’, which can occur in countries with a small population, like
Kazakhstan, and abundant oil and gas. This situation usually leads to high incomes
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Strategic Analysis 47
with not much effort in terms of industrial innovation and economic efficiency.46
Eichengreen found that when a country’s per capita GDP rises to somewhere between
$1,000 and $12,000 per person measured in 2010 dollars, its economy suddenly stalls
and annual growth falls by at least two percentage points a year. It gets stuck in the
lowest end of the middle. Countries in that situation hit the wall because easy gains
out of low-productivity sectors (oil and gas) and in higher-productivity sectors, as
well as from technology transfers, have reached the exhaustion point. This is exactly
where Kazakhstan is perched. A country with a limited number of comparative advan-
tages will be caught in the middle income and the constant policymaking uncertainty
resulting from hydrocarbon price fluctuation.
Escaping the middle-income trap, as a country like South Korea has done, requires
the creation of a functioning, competitive large-scale internal economy. Astana at
least has a sense of the importance of this goal since the 2011 presidential election.
Nazarbayev’s election programme was known as ‘Kazakhstan 2030’, with the slogan
‘Let’s Build the Future Together’.47 Whether the Kazakhstani elite can pull it off is a
matter for debate.
Developing closer trade relations with China entails risks for Kazakhstan. There
is an ongoing debate as to the ability of the Chinese economy to maintain during the
next five to 10 years growth rates as high as those experienced during the first decade
of the 21st century. For Kazakhstan, beneficial economic cooperation with China will
ultimately depend on its neighbour’s prosperity. For many years, economic analysts,
in both China and the West, have been warning policymakers about the pitfalls of an
overheating Chinese economy.48
Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, an economic analyst for The Telegraph, keeps repeat-
ing, often in a quite pessimistic way, that China may face the problems of household
over-expenditure in the not-too-distant future.49 Forbes analyst Shaun Rein, on his
part, has for years been warning about a looming dot-com bubble in China,50 a dan-
gerously increasing inflation rate, real estate problems and US–China trade tensions.51
The 2010 World Economic Forum and Bloomberg’s analysts have also identified wor-
rying signals of economic overheating.52 Even though the odds are low for a ‘hard
landing’, this scenario cannot be ruled out completely.53
The Kazakhstani economy is expected to become more and more dependent on
China’s investments, manufactured goods and energy imports. It runs the risk of being
exposed to a dependence on one all-powerful partner, as well as this partner’s eco-
nomic fortunes or misfortunes. All in all, this would mean substituting a dependency
on hydrocarbon exports for a dependency on a single trading partner. Oddly enough,
this hazard may be averted because authoritarian regimes are notoriously wary of a too
strong bilateral and multilateral cooperation. In effect, Astana is, to some extent, cau-
tious about China’s plans for the region, and consequently prefers to adopt a gradualist
approach in Kazakhstan–China bilateral relations rather than to let Beijing move in on
Kazakhstan’s assets in one big swoop.54
Astana under Nazarbayev has put in a lot of effort to enhance the Kazakhstani
economic presence in the West and the former Soviet republics. In fact, one of the
main features of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is the so-called ‘multi-vector’ approach,
which seeks to advance Kazakhstan’s national interests by balancing those of the West,
Russia and China, and ‘integration and openness to the entire world’.55 It follows that
Kazakhstani embassies and delegations abroad are actively committed to attracting
investment from all corners of the world. Such activism is remarkable in many respects,
especially as it is achieving concrete results. However, when Kazakhstan’s geographic
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48 Richard Rousseau
location is factored in, any optimism about the country’s long-term prospects for devel-
opment and prosperity is somewhat dampened. Despite its size (it is the world’s ninth
largest country), Kazakhstan is landlocked and abuts two colossal economic partners,
Russia and China. Other Central Asian states are in no way capable of offering com-
parably promising opportunities for economic cooperation. This largely explains why
Astana has embarked on a journey to elevate Kazakhstan to the status of ‘great power’
in the Eurasia region, while keeping windows open in the direction of the West.
Chinese migration
If Chinese investments and low-price goods are generally greatly welcomed by both
Central Asian governments and their citizens, the same cannot be said about Chinese
immigration, temporary or permanent. Complaints about incoming Chinese work-
ers are being heard more and more throughout Central Asia. Sometimes Central
Asians’ criticism is even directed at Chinese immigrant workers who build strategic
infrastructures, which would never see the light of day without China’s financial and
logistic input. Such negative sentiments are particularly strong in Kazakhstan, whose
low population size and density pale in comparison with those of prosperous China.
An increasing number of Kazakhstanis are fearful of a Chinese demographic expan-
sion in their country. Many also accuse Beijing of conspiring to colonise Central Asian
countries.56 Chinese attempts to lease a vast swath of Kazakhstani land in 2010 were
not well received by the local population, and this led to fierce and unusually large-scale
protests.57 Kazakhstanis are afraid that what awaits them is a demographic situation
resembling that of the Uyghurs in the Xinjiang autonomous region, which lies just
across the border, where the majority status of Uyghurs in the total population has
been progressively reduced as a result of a massive influx of ethnic Han, who are set
to become the majority in the not-so-distant future.58 Astana cannot afford to ignore
the possibility of such a scenario unfolding in Kazakhstan as well, as it could prove a
powerful impediment to economic integration between the two countries.
A double dilemma for Kazakhstan
Kazakhstani political authorities may have to face a harrowing policy dilemma. They
will have to either fully open up the country to China’s economic projects and become
more and more dependent on the economic performance of a neighbour that will soon
have a GDP approximately 100 times larger than that of Kazakhstan, or put up legal
and economic ramparts against Beijing’s foreign policy manoeuvres and limit itself to
pocketing only a fraction of the potential benefits that could be brought about by closer
bilateral relations. The Kazakhstanis’ growing feelings of hostility towards Chinese
penetration undoubtedly make it harder for Astana to solve this dilemma.
Niklas Swanstrom, director of the Stockholm-based Institute for Security and
Development Policy, is one analyst who believes that China–Kazakhstan relations will
not develop much further than their current level, precisely because Nazarbayev and
his entourage seem uninterested in setting in motion closer cooperation.59
Conclusion
Overall, China–Kazakhstan political and economic cooperation has achieved impres-
sive successes. The two countries are developing ties primarily in the energy sphere,
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while China seems to be encouraging Kazakhstan’s economic diversification. However,
to diversify the Kazakhstani economy, Chinese investment alone may not be sufficient.
Astana has to demonstrate a strong political will to successfully alter the economic
structure, even though this may deprive the ‘oligarchs’ of their control over whole
business sectors. Kazakhstan’s cooperation with China on security-related matters
has economic dimensions, which may ultimately prove to be more crucial than pure
mutual military assistance. In fact, Kazakhstan could become an indispensable ally
in Beijing’s efforts to quell social unrest in Xinjiang. The Kazakhstan–China eco-
nomic integration will rub off on both countries to Xinjiang’s benefit. In this regard,
the promotion of trade in border areas is particularly important.
There are drawbacks associated with further cooperation, however. Depending too
much on China may be dangerous for Kazakhstan. A serious economic downturn
experienced by China would spill over to Kazakhstan, much in the same way that an
economic recession in the United States always has deep consequences for Canadian
markets and exporters. Moreover, the two countries might be close to reaching the
limits of their cooperation. The wariness of Kazakhstani officials over China’s grow-
ing power and the local population’s fear of the Chinese demographic expansion may
prove to be insurmountable obstacles to future cooperation between the two countries.
In any event, Kazakhstan’s national economic problems are unlikely to be solved in
the near future.
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